2019年5月2日 · In connection with other minds, we might press Descartes’ first sceptical consideration, thus: I am sometimes deceived about what another is thinking or feeling.

The problem of other minds is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological question: "Given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds?" [1] The problem is that knowledge of other minds is always indirect.

How does the behaviorist conception of mind solve the problem of other minds? Fairly straightforwardly. Other minds skepticism gets its teeth from the idea that minds seem to be something that we have only first-person access to.

We can put the corresponding argument for skepticism about other minds as follows: 1. Perception is our only evidence for the existence of other minds. 2. We never directly perceive other minds, but only other bodies. 3. Our perception of other bodies is our only evidence for the existence of other minds. (1,2) 4.

2005年10月6日 · That other human beings are mostly very like ourselves is something about which almost all of us, almost all of the time, are certain. There are exceptions, among them philosophical sceptics, and perhaps those suffering from some abnormal mental condition.

2021年6月29日 · In this paper, I distinguish between two kinds of knowledge of other minds: a propositional kind, whereby one may say, for example, that “We can see that he is in pain,” and an objectual (object-related) kind which seems to be presupposed by knowledge claims about, for example, his present feeling of pain.

2022年12月24日 · Scepticism has been raised in connection with the world of bodies (or, as the sceptic would have it, the external world), in connection with minds (other minds), in connection with the past (the reliability of memory) and the future (the problem of induction).

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge.

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed ...

2005年10月6日 · That other human beings are mostly very like ourselves is something about which almost all of us, almost all of the time, are certain. There are exceptions, among them philosophical sceptics, and perhaps those suffering from some abnormal mental condition.