
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism - Wikipedia
In mechanism design, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism is a generic truthful mechanism for achieving a socially optimal solution whenever monetary transfers are available. It generalizes the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction into a general-purpose mechanism for social choice , which can be used to select any outcome from a set of ...
维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制是什么? - 知乎
Clarke Tax 是格罗夫斯机制的一种特例。 直观上来讲,这个机制是这样设计的:每个人(agent)揭示他对每种结果的估值,也就是说每种结果能给他带来多少的回报。
有没有比较好懂得例子解释维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制? - 知乎
vcg理论性质是很好,但在现实中基本没有应用。 Ausubel和Milgrom(2006)和Rothkopf(2007)解释了这一点。 大致说来包括以下几点:拍卖中卖家收益不高;有通讯等成本时性质糟糕;计算复杂(NP完全问题);面对串谋非常脆弱等等。
bank may overstate its need for a federal bailout, hoping to get taxpayers to absorb its losses. buyer might understate its value, hoping to get a lower price. VCG mechanisms achieve strategy-proof implementation of e¢ cient allocations in quasi-linear environments, but can have trouble with budget balance. N), and the designer 0.
维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制 - 维基百科,自由的百科全书
维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制 (英語: Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism)简称 VCG机制,是 机制设计 中实现社会最优解的通用真实机制,该机制是 维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯拍卖 的泛化。 VCG拍卖的任务只是在一群人中分配物品,VCG机制比VCG拍卖更具有普适性,它能用于在可行结果的集合中选择任何结果。 [1]:216–233. 表示所有可行解的集合。 有 个参与者,它们对每个结果有不同的估价。 参与者 对结果估值的函数可以表示为: 该函数用金钱表示了代理人对每一 …
VCG mechanism specifies that the PS4 should be purchased: x⇤ (v) = 1, but x⇤ (v i) = 0 for all i.
VCG discussion x(^v) = argmax x X i ^v i(x) p i(^v) = X j6=i v^ j(x(^v i)) X j6=i ^v j(x(^v)) You get paid everyone’s utility under the allocation that is actually chosen except your own, but you get that directly as utility Then you get charged everyone’s utility in the world where you don’t participate Thus you pay yoursocial cost VCG ...
The VCG Mechanism (aka Pivot Mechanism) •Definition 10.4.4 (Clarke tax) The Clarke tax sets the ℎ % term in a Groves mechanism as ℎ %)4?% =∑ )4 A(1()4?%)) AB%,where!is the Groves mechanism allocation function. •Definition 10.4.5 (Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism) The VCG mechanism is a direct quasilinear mechanism (1 ...
We introduce the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism mechanism, a direct auction for multiple goods, and argue that it is DSIC. In single-parameter environments, there is sometimes a single good, and sometimes more than one good (e.g., sponsored search; forth-coming), but the bidders themselves are always characterized by but one parameter.
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